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BY  
 
Bashar H. Malkawi* 
 
  I. Introduction  
       The United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter US-JO FTA) was the 
first FTA with an Arab country. In addition, the US-JO FTA was the second FTA 
between the U.S. and a middle-income country, after the U.S. and Canada expanded their 
FTA to include Mexico in North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There are 
several reasons that lead the U.S. to negotiate a free trade agreement with Jordan. Jordan 
was the right candidate for an FTA economically and politically. Economically, 
Jordanian imports into the U.S. would not threaten U.S. industries.1 The FTA could also 
spur Jordan’s economic growth, allowing for the possibility that it would become less 
dependant on foreign aid. Politically, the FTA reflects the U.S.’s appreciation for 
Jordan’s role in the Middle East peace process and cooperation with international 
counter-terrorism activities.    
                                               
* Bashar H. Malkawi is Assistant Professor of law at the Hashemite University. He holds S.J.D in 
International Trade Law from American University, Washington College of Law and LL.M in International 
Trade Law from the University of Arizona. I am grateful to Professor David Gantz at the University of 
Arizona and Professor Boris Kozolchyk, Director of National Center for Intern-American Free Trade for 
their tangible assistance and guidance. I also extend my thanks to Betty Thomas and Yasser Hamed for 
their research assistance and editorial help.     
1 A study conducted by the Office of Economics and the Office of Industries of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, found that Jordan’s exports to the U.S. would not have a measurable impact on U.S. 
industries, employment, and production. For one sector, textiles and apparels, a likely rise in U.S. imports 
of apparel is expected to have an effect, but this effect is a negligible. See U.S. International Trade 
Commission, Economic Impact on the United States of a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 5-1 Pub. No. 
3340 (Sep. 2000). 
       On June 6, 2000, King Abdullah II and then President Clinton declared that the U.S. 
and Jordan would negotiate for a free trade agreement.2 The US-JO FTA was signed in a 
record time on October 24, 2000. The National Assembly of Jordan ratified the US-JO 
FTA by acclamation in May 2001.3 The U.S. Congress approved the FTA implementing 
legislation in September 2001.4 President Bush signed the FTA into a law on September 
28, 2001.5 The US-JO FTA entered into force on December 17, 2001. 
       The US-JO FTA is comprised of a preamble, nineteen articles, three annexes, joint 
statements, memorandums of understanding, and side letters.6 The US-JO FTA covers 
trade in goods and services. Moreover, the FTA covers rules of origin, e-commerce, and 
dispute settlement mechanism.      
       The basic purpose of this article is to examine the social clause or the environment 
and labor provisions of the US-JO FTA.7 This article contends that the US-JO FTA labor 
and environmental provisions provide strong protection and it was a step forward. Recent 
U.S. FTAs with Arab countries, however, do not advance environment and labor 
protection. On the contrary, these FTAs move backward. 
                                               
2 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Make “Substantial” Progress in Talks on Free Trade Agreement, USTR 
Says, 17 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1224 (Aug. 3, 2000) (following a meeting between President Clinton and 
King Abdullah on June 6 in Washington, D.C., U.S. officials announced initiation of negotiations).  
3 See Royal Decree, Official Gazette No. 4486, page 1664 (Apr. 1, 2001).  
4 See The United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Area Implementation Act, H.2603, 107th 
Cong. (2001). 
5 See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 107-43, 115 Stat. 243, 
(2001).  
6 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I. L. M. 63. 
7 See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Boundaries of the WTO: The Question of Linkage, 96 Am. J. Intl L. 126, 127 
(2002) (the use of the social clause terminology is traced back to former USTR Carla Hills. This is not just 
a question of semantics. Underlying the determined efforts of these to-date mainly northern lobbies to work 
their agendas into trade institutions and treaties is a public relations machine that rationalizes the campaigns 
by arguing that there is an intrinsic, hence legitimate need to bring environment and labor onto the trade 
scene). 
       The environment and labor provisions of the US-JO FTA gives the agreement a 
human face because they address issues other than traditional trade matters, such as tariff 
reductions, quotas, and rules of origin. The preamble of the US-JO FTA includes 
statements relating to sustainable development, environment, and labor.8 However, the 
FTA covers environment and labor mainly in articles 5 and 6 respectively.  
       Negotiations to incorporate non-trade related environment and labor provisions into 
the FTA were undertaken to meet the demands of the U.S. administration.9 For the first 
time in U.S. trade history, a trade agreement included provisions that address 
environment and labor in the main text of the agreement.10 The inclusion of the social 
                                               
8 The FTA preamble states: [the U.S. and Jordan] Recognizing the objective of sustainable development, 
and seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a 
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different level of economic development”. 
The FTA preamble also states:  [the U.S. and Jordan] Desiring to promote higher labor standards by 
building on their respective international commitments and strengthening their cooperation on labor 
matters”. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, premable. 
Sustainable development is a concept that contemplates the use of natural resources to meet the needs of 
the current generation, without jeopardizing the resources for future generations. It embraces two concepts; 
the concepts of rational development (or wise use) and some elements of eco-development. Therefore, it is 
an inter-generational concept. It was enunciated in this format by the Brundtland Report, Our Common 
Future, of World of the Commission on Environment and Development of 1987.  For more on the concept 
of sustainable development see Michael McCloskey, The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Conundrum of 
Sustainable Development, 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 153, 155 (1999).  
9 See also Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the E.U, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional 
Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 Am. J. Intl. L. 231, 232, 235 (1997) (the trade-environment agenda is 
driven by wealthy states with relatively stringent environmental regulations which suggests that richer 
countries will produce less pollution per unit of output than poorer countries-not that richer countries 
produce less total pollution than poorer countries. Richer countries tend to be more powerful in trade 
negotiations than poorer countries since, in the international trade context, “power” may be seen as a 
function of relative market size. When powerful countries engage in an integration-deepening exercise, 
they require enhanced trade-environment solutions as part of the package they bring home for domestic 
ratification).  
10 See Howard Mann, NAFTA and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 Tul. Envt. L.J. 387, 409 
(2000) (suggesting that the impact of trade agreements on sustainable development requires that the 
environment be treated as an issue that is “over here”, inside the agreement, not “over there” in another 
agreement). See Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Worker Rights: A Practical Alternative, 20 
Comp. Lab. L. & Policy 401, 405 (1999) (arguing that incorporating worker rights into the main body of 
multilateral agreements has reached a dead end. The only path to progress now is unilateral actions on the 
part of the U.S. The more effective way is to resort to aggressive unilateral action).   
clause in the FTA was determined more by economic and political needs that existed in 
the U.S. than by pressures exerted by Jordanian trade unions and environmental groups.  
       Section II gives background to the inclusion of environment and labor in the US-JO 
FTA, and briefly describes the divergent views for including or not including these issues 
in trade agreements. Section III analyzes the environment provisions of the US-JO FTA. 
It points out the inadequacies in the environment provisions. This section further points 
out the differences between the environment provisions of the US-JO FTA and the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. Section IV reviews the labor 
provisions of the US-JO FTA. In addition, section IV explains the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation. Section V discusses recent FTAs concluded between 
the U.S. and Arab countries such as Bahrain and Oman. Section VI presents some 
methods which have the potential of finding a common ground between free trade, 
environment and labor rights for future trade agreements between the U.S. and Arab 
countries. Concluding observations are in section VII.   
II. Background: Debate between Free Trade Advocates, Environmentalists, and 
Labor Unions   
  
       The debate between advocates of free trade, environmentalists, and labor unions 
permeates free trade negotiations. It is highly probable that future trade agreements will 
have to withstand criticism from proponents and opponents of free trade. The US-JO 
FTA endured attacks by both environmentalists and labor unions, and free trade 
advocates.  
       Inclusion of environmental and labor provisions within free trade agreements 
remains controversial. Environmentalists and labor unions believe that free trade 
agreements and environmental and labor regulations are reconcilable and work in 
concert.11 Environmentalists and labor unions argue that free trade causes a race to the 
bottom, in which companies move their operations to the trading partner with the lowest 
environmental and labor standards. On the other side of the debate are free trade 
advocates opposed to attaching environmental and labor standards to trade deals. They 
fear that environmental and labor regulation is being used as an illegitimate means for 
unfairly protecting domestic industry against foreign corporations.12 Their fear is 
premised on the philosophy of protectionism. Free trade advocates contend that the 
inclusion of environmental and labor provisions in trade agreements is a barrier to trade. 
This barrier, they argue, does not improve environmental and labor protection. They 
reason that a country cannot afford to protect its environment and workers if it does not 
have the necessary financial resources. 
       Free trade advocates argue that free trade ensures economic growth which will create 
the financial means to protect the environment and worker rights. Thus, the best way to 
encourage higher standards of environmental and labor protection is through free trade, 
and the growth it creates. As a country grows economically and is more prosperous is one 
more likely to be able to take care of their environment and a one more prosperous is one 
more likely to take care of their workforce.  
       An understanding of the legislative background and political backdrop in which the 
US-JO FTA was negotiated and ultimately signed is necessary to appreciate its structure 
and possible application to future trade agreements between the U.S. and Arab countries. 
A. Environmental and Labor Protection of the US-JO FTA Debated in Congress 
       The conflict between proponents of free trade, environmentalists, and labor unions 
                                               
11 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free International Trade and Protection of the 
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 Am. J. Intl.L. 700 (1992). 
12 See Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice 1539 (2d ed. Lexis Publishing 2001). 
was apparent during the US-JO FTA negotiations. Significant congressional debate 
ensued regarding the US-JO FTA’s inclusion of environmental and labor provisions. The 
US-JO FTA is the first trade agreement directly including provisions on environmental 
and labor regulations in the agreement’s main text which are subject to the agreement’s 
dispute settlement process. 
       U.S. industries were opposed to the imposition of labor and environmental standards 
through trade sanctions in the US-JO FTA. Representatives from the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Business Roundtable (an 
association of chief executive officers of 150 U.S. companies) stated their belief that the 
labor and environmental provisions should be stripped out of the FTA. For example, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed the use of trade sanctions stating that “the sole 
purpose of the FTA is load it with labor and environmental standards, and sold it as a 
template that future trade agreements should follow.”13  
       Environmental groups favor the use of environmental standards in the main text and 
their enforcement by invoking trade sanctions. The National Wildlife Federation and 
Defenders of Wildlife advocated the use of environmental standards enforced by trade 
sanctions in the US-JO FTA.14 Labor groups also favor the use of trade sanctions in the 
US-JO FTA, the same way environmental standards would be enforced.15 The FTA 
received overwhelming and diverse support in Jordan from both the General Federation 
                                               
13 See Gray G. Yerkey, U.S. Chamber Will Press Congress to Pull “Non-Trade” Provisions From U.S.-
Jordan FTA 17 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1685 (Nov. 2, 2000) (stating Thomas Donohue, president and CEO 
of the U.S. chamber of commerce [which represents about three million businesses] saying that it is 
inappropriate in the chamber’s view to seek to address social issues in trade agreements. He stated that the 
chamber will work with Congress to remove unnecessary non-trade provisions from the pact).  
14 See U.S., Jordan Ratify Trade Pact with Environmental Provisions, Oct. 4, 2001, available at Lexis 
Environmental News Network. See also Hearing Testimony on U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement by Rodger 
Schlickeisen, March. 20, 2001, available at Lexis Federal Document Clearing House Congressional 
Testimony.   
15 See Joseph Kahn, Labor Praises New Trade Pact with Jordan, N.Y. Times, October 25, 2000, at C1. 
of Jordanian Trade Unions and from the Jordanian American Business Association.16 
       The Senate Finance committee held a mark-up session for the US-JO FTA 
implementation bill, during which Republican Senator Phil Gramm offered an 
amendment that would have restricted the scope of the FTA dispute resolution 
mechanism when dealing with environmental and labor issues. The amendment was 
rejected. During the Senate debate, Senator Gramm warned that he would oppose any 
effort to turn the US-JO FTA into a model.17 Senator Gramm and Rep. Dreier argued that 
including labor and environmental provisions in all trade agreements would lead to a loss 
of sovereignty by the U.S. and subject the country to penalties for pursuing its economic 
self interest. Senator Gramm urged environmental and labor protection should be left to 
each individual country and should not be a part of trade deals.  
       On the other hand, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, Rep. Levin, 
and Rep. Bonior indicated that the US-JO FTA would set a precedent for how future 
trade agreements would address issues like labor and the environment. Senator Baucus 
argued the US-JO FTA’s inclusion of environmental provisions was a positive 
development. He also disagreed with Senator Gramm’s statement that the provisions 
would undermine U.S. sovereignty or prevent lawmakers from enacting and enforcing 
U.S. environmental and labor laws. Senator Gramm concurs with free trade advocates 
who oppose the inclusion of environmental provisions in trade agreements. Senator 
Baucus’ views coincide with environmentalists.  
                                               
16 See Gray G. Yerkey, House Democrats Hail “Precedent” Set By Labor, Environment Clauses in Jordan 
FTA 17 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1685 (Nov. 2, 2000) (citing a letter by Richard A. Gephardt dating Oct. 24 
saying that Jordanian business, labor, and environmental communities were united in their support of 
including labor and environmental issues in trade negotiations).  
17 Mary Jane Bolle, Library of Congress, Congress Research Service Report, Jordan-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) (Sept. 25, 2001). 
       After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., Senator Gramm dropped his effort 
to block the implementation of the US-JO FTA. Senator Gramm explained that he 
decided not to oppose the agreement because it was important that the U.S. send a signal 
of friendship to Jordan, an ally.18 Arguably, if the September 11, 2001, attacks on the 
U.S. did not occur, the proposed US-JO FTA would not have been implemented. 
III. Environmental Protection and the US-JO FTA 
       While the US-JO FTA includes specific references to environment in various 
articles, article 5 is the main environmental provision.19 The US-JO FTA was the first 
trade agreement to include environmental provisions in its main text. On the other hand, 
NAFTA contains environmental protection provisions in a side agreement, known as the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).20 
A. Analysis 
       The US-JO FTA considers lower environmental protection to be unfair trade. The 
purpose of the FTA is to prevent race to the bottom.21 Accordingly, the U.S. and Jordan 
                                               
18 Some Congressmen softened the pass of the implementing legislation of the FTA by weaving the FTA in 
historical friendship relationship between the two countries. For example, Rep. Kolbe of Arizona played 
down the environmental and labor provisions of the FTA on foreign policy argument. He stated that Jordan 
has played a very difficult role in promoting peace in the region. It is in the heart of a region that is plagued 
by centuries of conflict. It lies on the edge of a potential conflict all along all of its borders. Rep. Cantor of 
Virginia fashions the FTA in a foreign policy issue stating that in a region where daily violence has almost 
become a fact of life, the establishment of economic cooperation is a vitally important aspect of creating an 
environment where the nations of the Middle East can exist in peace and with prosperity. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 107-176, at 4878 (2001). 
19 For example, the U.S. and Jordan may exclude from patentability certain inventions to avoid prejudice to 
the environment. Additionally, the FTA incorporates by reference article XX of GATT 1994 including 
environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and measures relating to 
the conservation of “living and non-living” exhaustible natural resources. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: 
Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, arts. 4.18 & 12.1.    
20 See North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1480.  
21 The term “race-to-the-bottom” refers to a progressive relaxation of environmental standards, spurred by 
competition to attract industry. The widely accepted theoretical model for the race-to-the-bottom is non-
cooperative game theory. According to this model, although all states would be better off if they each 
cooperated with each other by collectively maintaining optimally stringent environmental standards, the 
incentives are such that each state will instead relax its standards in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to attract 
“shall strive” not to waive or derogate from environmental laws as an encouragement of 
trade with each other.22 However, the FTA language in this regard is non-binding because 
it uses mostly hortatory language such as “shall strive”. Moreover, the FTA only 
mentions trade as the economic activity not to be encouraged by relaxing domestic laws. 
Since investments are not included, the FTA leaves open the possibility of 
environmentally damaging investments that do not comply with environmental standards. 
       The US-JO FTA permits each country to determine its own substantive 
environmental laws, but requires that those laws provide high levels of environmental 
protection and strive to improve them.23 Therefore, the FTA does not override current 
Jordan or U.S. environmental laws.24 While the FTA neither requires harmonization of 
environmental laws nor sets minimum environmental standards, it omits a method for 
determining what is considered “high levels of environmental protection.” Since the 
parties are only required to “strive to” improve those laws, an inference can be made that 
the FTA does not compel actual improvement. The US-JO FTA could have mandated a 
firmer obligation on the parties by removing the words “strive to” from the language. 
                                                                                                                                            
industry. For more see Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and is it 
“to the Bottom,” 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 297 (1997). 
22 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 5.1. 
23 The US-JO FTA states “Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental protection and environmental development policies, and to adopt or modify accordingly its 
environmental laws, each party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for high levels of environmental 
protection and shall strive to continue improve those laws”. United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement 
Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a 
Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 5.2. 
 24 The environmental statutes of the U.S. have been recognized as some of the most rigorous in the world. 
See Michael J. Kelly, Environmental Implications of North American Free Trade Agreement, 3 Ind. Intl. & 
Comp. L. Rev. 361, 368 (1993). U.S. environmental statutes include: Clean Air Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 
7401 (2000) Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251 (2000), The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000), The Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000), The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 
U.S.C. § 4332 (2000), and The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000). 
       The FTA requires that the parties “effectively enforce” their environmental laws.25 
However, the FTA does not determine how each party will enforce its environmental 
laws. The FTA leaves to each party the choice of measure of enforcement. The FTA 
speaks of “effective enforcement,” which excludes actions by the U.S. Congress or 
Jordanian National Assembly. In other words, the FTA applies only to the executive 
actions and does not apply to actions by the legislature. 
       To measure whether either party of the FTA has failed to “effectively enforce” its 
environmental laws, the agreement provides a two-prong test. This test requires a 
“sustained or recurring” course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade between 
the parties. The FTA does not define the terms “sustained or recurring.” Although 
“sustained or recurring” implies something that happens more than one time, the 
definition may not be settled so easily. For example, “sustained or recurring” may be 
defined as a failure to act twice every year, ten times in one month, or a failure to act 
every two years. The second-prong of the test requires that the sustained action/inaction 
be in a manner that affects trade. This prong determines what violation is actionable or 
non-actionable. Only sustained action or inaction that “affects” trade is actionable. 
Therefore, environmental obligations are linked to trade in a manner that would 
otherwise be considered an intrusion into the domestic arena of the FTA parties. The 
second-prong of the test does not determine if the US-JO FTA covers trade under this 
agreement only or extends to other trade arrangements such as the qualifying industrial 
zones program between the U.S. and Jordan.  
                                               
25 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 5.3 (a). 
       The US-JO FTA reserves to each party the right to exercise discretion in the 
investigation, prosecution, regulation, and compliance with environmental matters.26 The 
FTA considers a party not in violation of its obligation to “effectively enforce” its 
environmental laws if that party exercises reasonable discretion or makes a bona fide 
decision as to how allocate resources. This language may be used to avoid the stringent 
obligation of effective enforcement of environmental laws. First, the FTA provides the 
parties with significant discretion and flexibility in prioritizing their environmental needs 
and allocation of resources. Further, the FTA subjects the compliance and enforcement 
components to the availability of technical and financial resources. The FTA language is 
subject to so many caveats that, in reality, it is hard to imagine any circumstance 
egregious enough to constitute a violation. 
       Environmental laws in the US-JO FTA are defined as statutes, regulations, or 
provisions with the primary purpose of the protection of environment or prevention of a 
danger to human, animal, or plant life or health.27 These environmental laws or 
regulations include: those related to the prevention, abatement or control of the release, 
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental contaminants, those related to the 
control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, and those related to the 
protection of wild flora and fauna and their habitat. Under the FTA, environmental laws 
are defined narrowly to those laws and regulations “primarily” aimed at protecting the 
environment or preventing a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health. Under the 
US-JO FTA definition, agricultural law or mining law, for example, may be excluded 
                                               
 26 Id. art. 5.3.   
27 Id. art. 5.4. The definition of environmental laws in article 5 of the US-JO FTA FTA is wider in scope 
than that of article 45.2 of the NAAEC. Environmental law in the NAAEC is defined as any statute or 
regulation the primary purpose is to protect the environment, or to prevent a danger to human life or health. 
Thus, article 5 of the FTA includes the prevention of danger to animal or plant life or health. 
from coverage. The FTA does not determine the scope of what laws qualify as 
environmental law. 
       The US-JO FTA fails to address the distinction between standards regulating a final 
product and standards regulating the process of production of that product.28 The failure 
to make the distinction will restrict the ability of the U.S. to exclude Jordanian products 
produced in a manner that is damaging to the environment.29 In addition, the FTA fails to 
set forth the relationship between the US-JO FTA and international environmental 
agreements that use international trade measures as enforcement mechanisms.30 The 
absence of a definitive relationship between the US-JO FTA and these international 
agreements may be seen as a major setback for those seeking to use trade as a vehicle for 
environmental protection. Finally, the US-JO FTA does not force Jordan to use wealth 
generated from trade resulting from the FTA for environmental protection.  
                                               
28 The standards regulating the process of production of a product are known as process and production 
methods (PPMs). PPMs specify criteria for how a product is manufactured, harvested, or taken. Terms such 
as “made with”, “produced by”, and “harvested by” signify a PPMs standard. All PPM standards apply to 
the production stage, for example before a product is placed on the market for sale. These standards specify 
criteria for how a product is produced or processed. However, the PPM standard may address the 
environmental effects of a product all during its life-cycle, for example effects which may emerge when the 
product is produced, transported, consumed or used, and disposed of. For more on PPMs see Steve 
Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J. 
Intl L. 59, 65 (2002) (the subject of PPMs is one of the knotty controversies in the debate over trade and 
environment. The term “processes and production methods” originated in the GATT agreement of 1979 on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and referred to product standards focused on the production method rather than 
product characteristics).  
29 In GATT Tuna/Dolphin II case, a case based on article XX exception of GATT 1994 which is 
incorporated by reference in the FTA, the panel ruled that import restrictions may not be imposed on 
products solely because they were made or obtained in an environmentally unsound manner outside the 
jurisdiction of the importing country. The panel reasoned that measures designed to make other countries 
change their policies, and that are effective only if such changes occur, are not considered justifiable under 
Article XX (g). See GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M 
839 (1994), para. 5.39. 
30 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 1.2. Article 104 of NAFTA 
provides that in the event of an inconsistency between NAFTA and the trade provisions of the listed 
international environmental agreements, the obligation of a party to use a trade measure under the 
international environmental agreements “shall prevail” to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that 
where a party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such 
obligations, the party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of 
NAFTA. 
B. The US-JO FTA and NAAEC Compared 
       The US-JO FTA was the second trade agreement to include environment provisions. 
NAFTA was negotiated with a side agreement concerning the environment.31 The 
NAAEC and article 5 of the US-JO FTA both protect the environment and share some 
substantive norms. For example, like the US-JO FTA, NAAEC permits each country to 
determine its own substantive environmental laws.32 
       There are several important differences between article 5 of the US-JO FTA and 
NAAEC. The environmental provisions in the US-JO FTA can be found in the core text 
of the FTA. On the other hand, environmental protection in NAFTA can be found in a 
side agreement known as NAAEC. 
        The NAAEC relies on moral persuasion, publicity, and dialogue to ensure 
compliance. For example, NAAEC requires each party to prepare and periodically 
publish a report on the state of environment in its territory.33 On the other hand, the US-
JO FTA does not contain a similar provision requiring periodic reports on the state of 
environment. Moreover, the US-JO FTA does not address some of the provisions that 
were addressed in NAAEC. Under NAAEC, any non-governmental organization or 
individual person may assert a claim to the NAAEC Secretariat that a party is failing to 
                                               
31 Originally, NAFTA was negotiated without an agreement concerning the environment and labor. 
However, then President Clinton has indicated, when he took over presidency, that he would not submit 
NAFTA to Congress until negotiations have been completed on several side agreements regarding the 
environment, labor, and import surges. See Gustavo Vega-Canovas, NAFTA and the Environment, 30 
Denv. J. Intl. L. & Policy 55, 56 (2001). The NAAEC was implemented to alleviate the concerns of many 
NAFTA critics who feared that NAFTA would prompt economic growth at the expense of the 
environment. See Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 Fla. J. 
Intl. L. 471, 482 (1990) (citing criticism that came also from agriculture, consumer, human rights, and 
religious groups). See also Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA Up to Its Green Expectations? Effective Law 
Enforcement Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 
1591, 1591 (1999).   
32 See North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation, art. 3, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1480. 
33 Id. art. 2.1. 
effectively enforce its environmental laws.34 Because of this claim procedure, many 
private petitions have been filed that sought to challenge the enforcement of 
environmental regulations in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.35 
       The NAAEC also establishes a state-to-state dispute settlement process for the failure 
to enforce environmental laws.36 Thus, NAAEC creates a two-tiered system: chapter 
twenty dispute settlement mechanism for any dispute arising under NAFTA and the 
separate NAAEC dispute settlement process. NAAEC permits a dispute panel to impose 
monetary fines against a country found to have engaged in a persistent pattern of 
ineffective environmental law enforcement.37  While NAAEC creates a two-tiered 
system, the US-JO FTA establishes a single dispute settlement mechanism for all 
disputes arise under the agreement.38 Moreover, while the NAAEC imposes monetary 
                                               
 34 NAAEC requires for any submission to identify the organization making the submission and that its aim 
is to promote enforcement and not to harass an industry. The submission must merit requesting a response 
from the party in question. The Secretariat determines that a factual record is warranted, it shall do so upon 
approval by the council of the Commission on Environmental Cooperation. The council can make the 
factual record public upon two-thirds vote. Id. art. 14.1. 
35 Between 1995 and 2000, twenty-eight citizens’ submissions on enforcement matters were registered: 
nine regarding Canadian enforcement, eleven regarding Mexican enforcement and eight regarding U.S. 
enforcement. Two factual records have been published to date. The first factual record was “The Cozumel 
Factual Record” of 1997 concerning port terminal project in Playa Paraíso, Cozumel, Quintana Roo in 
Mexico. The second factual record was “The BC Hydro factual record” of 1997 concerning hydroelectric 
dams in British Columbia, Canada. The third factual record was “The Metales y Derivados Factual Record” 
of 1998 concerning lead smelter in Tijuana, Mexico. See Mark R. Goldschmidt, The Role of Transparency 
and Public Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, 29 B.C Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 343, 376-383 (2002). 
36 See North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation, supra n. 32, art. 22. 
37 Id. art. 34.4.b. 
38 The US-JO FTA uses a multi-step process for dispute settlement. Under the US-JO FTA, the parties must 
first make every attempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through consultations whenever a 
dispute arises concerning interpretation of the agreement, a party considers that the other party has failed to 
carry out its obligations under the agreement, or a party considers that measures taken by the other party 
severely distort the balance of trade benefits accorded by the agreement or substantially undermine 
fundamental objectives of the agreement. If the parties fail to resolve their dispute through consultations 
within sixty days, either party may refer the matter to the Joint Committee, which tries to resolve the 
dispute. If the Joint Committee does not resolve the matter within either ninety days or another period that 
they have agreed upon, either party can refer the matter to the dispute settlement panel. In order to resolve 
the dispute, the dispute settlement panel prepares non-binding recommendations in a report. Within ninety 
days, the dispute settlement panel has to present a report to the parties containing findings of fact and its 
determination. Regrettably, since the report is not binding, the US-JO FTA’s dispute settlement system 
fines, the US-JO FTA imposes trade sanctions for failure to enforce environmental 
protection.39 Trade sanctions under the US-JO FTA include tariff increases, import bans, 
reductions in financial aid, or other financial penalties. However, the US-JO FTA does 
not determine how to measure or quantify trade sanctions that would be commensurate 
with a violation of an environment provision of the FTA. 
       To ease concerns regarding imposing trade sanctions for environmental violations, 
the U.S. and Jordan exchanged side letters, whereby both parties expressed their intention 
not to exercise trade sanctions for these violations.40 These letters were requested by the 
U.S. and not Jordan. They were the U.S. idea.41 Although it is too early to forecast 
whether these letters will affect the actions of the U.S. or Jordan, the validity of these 
letters is in question. Based on the experience of the NAFTA sugar side letter, the U.S. 
and Jordan should have included the language of the letters into the main text of the FTA 
so as to form a binding, legal commitment.42      
                                                                                                                                            
really just acts as a mediator between the parties. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The 
United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area, supra n. 6, art. 17.1. 
39 After the dispute settlement panel compiles its report, the Joint Committee then endeavors to resolve the 
dispute, taking the report into account. If the Joint Committee does not resolve the dispute within thirty 
days after receiving the panel report, the affected party “shall be entitled to take any appropriate and 
commensurate measure.” This provision in the US-JO FTA appears to permit the use of trade sanctions as 
an enforcement mechanism. Id. art. 17.2. 
40 On July 23, 2001, former USTR Robert Zoellick and then Jordan’s Ambassador to the U.S. Marwan 
Muasher, exchanged formal and official letters which discussed the implementation of the FTA’s dispute 
settlement procedures. In the letters, both countries stated their intention not to apply the agreement’s 
dispute settlement enforcement procedures in a manner that results in blocking trade. The letters also state 
that bilateral consultations and other procedures such as alternative mechanisms would be appropriate 
measures that will help secure compliance without recourse to traditional trade sanctions.  
41 See Grary G. Yerkey, USTR Says Bush Administration Supports U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement “as 
it is,” 18 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1013 (June 28, 2001) (Sen. Grassley suggested attaching “side letters” to 
the agreement in which the United States and Jordan promise not to use sanctions to enforce labor and 
environmental provisions of the accord). See also Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Tells Abdullah He Will Push 
Hill To Adopt Jordan Free-Trade Agreement, 18 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 632 (Apr. 19, 2001) (Jordanians 
indicated that they are going to leave that [specifics of environment and labor provisions] to the [U.S.] 
administration to work with Congress directly).   
42 During the NAFTA debate, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to a sugar deal that was attached as a side letter 
to the text of NAFTA. However, the U.S. and Mexico are still litigating the validity of the letter.  
IV. Labor Protection and the US-JO FTA 
A. Analysis 
       The US-JO FTA was the first trade agreement to include labor protection provisions 
in its main text. The agreement requires the U.S. and Jordan to “strive” to ensure that 
internationally recognized labor rights are recognized and protected within domestic 
law.43  In addition, the U.S. and Jordan reaffirmed their obligations as members of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO).44 Jordan has ratified all of the ILO fundamental 
conventions, of which there are eight.45 In contrast, the U.S. has ratified only two of the 
conventions: the convention concerning abolition of forced labor and the convention 
eliminating worst forms of child labor.46 The language of the FTA not only indicates 
trade inconsistency but it also indicates trade hypocrisy on the part of the U.S. 
       The FTA ensures that each party does not waive or derogate from its domestic labor 
laws.47 The U.S. and Jordan have the right to set their own domestic labor standards. The 
FTA does not require the harmonization of labor norms. The FTA requires each party to 
effectively enforce its labor laws. Thus, the FTA adopts the “enforce its labor laws” 
standard, which is an indication that Jordanian labor laws comply with ILO standards. 
The U.S. and Jordan may exercise discretion in allocating resources in the enforcement of 
their labor laws. 
                                               
43 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 6.1.  
44 The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation is absent any linkage between ILO conventions 
and internationally recognized labor rights. Reference to the ILO in NAALC is limited to article 24.1 which 
mandates that the ECE chairman be selected from a roster of experts in consultation with the ILO. 
45 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Trade and core Labor 
Standards 24 (2000). 
46 Id. at 25. The U.S. have not ratified conventions on freedom of association, right to organize and bargain 
collectively, equal payment, non-discrimination, and minimum age. 
47 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 6.2. 
       The US-JO FTA recognizes cooperation as a mean for enhanced opportunities to 
improve labor standards.48 The FTA defines labor laws as those statutes and regulations 
that are directly related to internationally recognized labor rights.49 The FTA excludes 
from its coverage of labor rights the right to strike and the right of non-discrimination in 
employment.50 If gender equality was incorporated in the US-JO FTA, it may have 
generated great criticism in Jordan due to cultural or religious concerns. International 
labor rights are not culture-neutral but rather are culture-laden. Labor laws in Jordan 
reflect a balance between religious and social forces. 
B. The US-JO FTA and NAALC Compared  
       While the US-JO FTA includes labor provisions within its main text, NAFTA 
contains labor protection provisions in a side agreement. NAFTA originally was 
negotiated without addressing labor issues. However, this sparked tremendous concern on 
the part of unions.51 U.S. companies would potentially move to Mexico because of lower 
labor and wage standards.52 The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC) came into existence to address these concerns.  
                                               
48 Id. art. 6.5. 
49 These internationally recognized labor rights are: right of association, right to organize and bargain 
collectively, prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, minimum age for the 
employment of children, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health. Id. art. 6.6. 
50 NAALC includes laws against employment discrimination. See Reka S. Koerner, Pregnancy 
Discrimination in Mexico: Has Mexico Complied with the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation?  4 Tex. F. C.L. & C.R. 235, 236-241 (1999).  
51 Matthew J. Griffin, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A Flawed Attempt at 
Promoting Continental Labor Standards, 21 Suffolk Transnatl. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1997) (noting American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was major opponent of NAFTA. 
U.S. labor unions objected to the lack of penalties within NAALC for violations of industrial relations law 
and the cumbersome nature of NAALC process).   
52 Then presidential candidate Ross Perot described Mexico as “great sucking sound”. See Marley Weiss, 
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC): Accelerating Development (s)? SE27 
ALI-ABA 909, 911 (1999). 
       The NAALC aims at improving working conditions and living standards.53  It 
acknowledges the right of each party to establish its own domestic labor standards. 
However, NAALC requires each party to ensure that its labor laws and regulations 
provide high labor standards consistent with high quality and productivity in workplaces. 
NAALC provides an illustrative list of government actions that each party may take to 
effectively enforce its labor laws.54 
       NAALC created a Commission for Labor Cooperation to facilitate its objectives in a 
cooperative and consultative manner.55 The organizational structure of the NAALC also 
includes a national component, the National Administrative Offices (NOAs). The NAO is 
a unique institution that takes up labor rights issues outside the national territory.56 Unlike 
the US-JO FTA, any government, non-governmental organization, or individual may 
submit complaints regarding labor issues involving other NAALC countries to the NAO 
of their own country. The main advancements in the NAALC evolution were made 
through the NAO public complaints review.57 Since the NAALC’s entry into force, a 
total of twenty-three labor submissions have been filed.58      
                                               
53 See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 1, Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. 
54 Id. art. 3. 
55 Id. art. 8. 
56 See Lance A. Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes 
Shape, 3 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 159, 163 (1995) (a critical function of NAO is to review labor law matters in one 
or both of the other NAALC parties, not domestic matters. In this sense, the thrust of the NAO’s function 
runs counter to the otherwise firm preservation of sovereignty under NAALC).  
57 See Emmanuelle Mazuyer, Labor Regulation in the North American Free Trade Area: A Study on the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Policy J. 239, 244 (2001). 
58 One of the well known submissions concerning labor law matters under NAALC public submission 
procedure was the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), a U.S. labor union, submission. That 
submission involved workers at a Honeywell electronics factory in Chihuahua, Mexico who were fired 
after expressing an interest in joining an independent Mexican labor organization. In a report released in 
Oct. 1994, the U.S. NAO found that the former Honeywell employees accepted severance pay from the 
company and, thereby, had preempted an investigation by Mexican officials into their dismissals. On that 
basis, the NAO declared that it could not conclude that Mexico failed to enforce its labor laws and that it 
could not recommend that the dispute proceed to ministerial consultations. See David Lopez, Dispute 
Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 Tex. Intl. L.J. 163, 196 (1997).  
       The NAALC created a dispute settlement mechanism to resolve disputes over any 
matter that could affect the operation of the NAALC.59 However, NAALC dispute 
settlement mechanism applies only to occupational safety and health standards, child 
labor issues, or minimum wage right that are trade-related and mutually recognized by 
labor laws of each party.60 Other labor principles such as forced labor, right of 
association, right to organize and bargain collectively, and hours of work are not 
covered.61 Therefore, the basis for actionable violations is wider in scope under the US-
JO FTA than under the NAALC. The NAALC was criticized for its failure to include 
sanctions for basic labor-relations violations. In the history of the NAALC, not a single 
case has reached the arbitration process. The dispute resolution procedures established by 
NAALC are bureaucratic, byzantine, cumbersome, and protracted, all of which would 
hamper timely settlements.  
       The U.S., in the FTA with Jordan, assumes that labor standards in Jordan are not 
adequately protected. The U.S. overlooks the fact it should itself begin protecting worker 
rights by extending labor protection to agricultural workers. Otherwise, it seems 
                                               
59 NAALC created four-step dispute settlement process that consists of: 1) initial consultations between 
NAOs regarding the other party’s labor law, its administration, or labor market conditions in its territory 2) 
ministerial consultations regarding any matter within the scope of NAALC 3) expert evaluations regarding 
patterns of non-enforcement of domestic labor law in each party country and 4) further consultations 
whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively enforce occupational safety 
and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards that may lead to non-binding arbitration. 
See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supra n. 53, art. 20. 
60 Id. art. 29.1. 
61 Labor principles under NAALC are subject to different treatment. Right of association, right to organize 
and bargain, and right to strike are subject only to review and consultation. Eight technical labor principles 
concerned with forced labor, child labor, minimum wage and hour standards, employment discrimination, 
equal pay for men and women, job health and safety, workers’ compensation for occupational injuries and 
illnesses and protection of migrant workers are subject to evaluation and recommendations by an ECE. 
Only violations of child labor, health and safety, and minimum wage and hour standards can go forward to 
dispute resolution with the possibility of sanctions. In case of an alleged persistent of failure to enforce 
occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wages technical labor standards, the last venue is 
the dispute resolution by an arbitral panel, which may develop an action plan for effective enforcement of 
national labor law. Failure to implement this plan may result in fines or trade sanctions. 
hypocritical on the part of the U.S. The U.S. labor laws favor employers over 
employees.62 Moreover, the U.S. is a country where May 1st, the International Workers’ 
Day, is not considered a Federal holiday or even celebrated.63  
       In Jordan, the only existing union federation is heavily dependent on government 
financial support.64 The government subsidizes the union federation, which is considered 
a restriction on the right to establish a free union. Even the U.S. AFL-CIO cannot escape 
such criticism.65 In the U.S. today only about one out of every seven workers belongs to a 
labor union. The principal causes for the decline of U.S. organized labor are its overuse 
of the work stoppage, tolerance for criminal infiltration or corruption, its philosophical 
underpinnings, and its tolerance for the entrenchment of internal power.66 
                                               
62 See Andrew K. Stutzman, Our Eroding Industrial Base: U.S. Labor Laws Compared With Labor Laws of 
Less Developed Nations in Light of the Global Economy, 12 Dick. J. Intl. L. 135, 142 (1993) (the U.S. 
judiciary is reluctant to protect employee rights and that it construes worker projections narrowly in favor 
of employers. Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly protect worker’ rights). 
63 The May 1st, International Worker’s Day, dates back to the eight-hour working day movement. See Scott 
D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLASA, 19 Hofstra Lab. & Empl. L.J. 1, 13 (2001) (the eight-hour movement of 
the nineteenth century is based on a vision of working less, living more. It embraces workers’ desire for 
personal time from industrial order, and freedom for home life and cultural matters outside wage and job 
concerns. (8 hours for work, 8 hours for sleep, and 8 hours for what we will).The movement started. In 
1886, Sameul Gompers, the leader of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, called for a 
nationwide strike by all workers on May 1st to achieve shorter working hours. This strike became the first 
general strike in the history of the international labor movement. The U.S. Army and riot-trained police 
surpassed the strike by use of force).   
64 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, supra n. 45, at 94. 
65 Organized labor is embodied in the U.S. umbrella confederation, the American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).  The key forces behind the creation of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations had roots in socialism with events during and just after World War I effectively 
purged organized labor of its radical elements. The AFL is composed mainly of the craft unions and the 
CIO by contrast organized workers in the mass industrial sector, the basic industries. The American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations often quarreled over direction and 
philosophy. The AFL had a horizontal structure-all electricians were in the electrician’s union regardless of 
their employer, and the CIO was organized vertically-all auto workers belonged to the auto workers union, 
regardless of their job description-and these competing structures generated jurisdictional infighting. The 
typical craft union member was also different from the typical industrial worker. The latter was more likely 
to be a relatively recent Eastern European immigrant who brought some Marxist ideology along or a 
worker from the ranks of the underprivileged social classes in America such as the southern Black workers 
who had migrated northward and into the factories and manufacturing plants after World War I. See 
Fredrick Englehart, Withered Giants: Mexican and U.S. Organized Labor and the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 29 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 321 (1997).  
66 The Laborers International Union of North America was one of four major unions singled out as corrupt 
by a presidential commission in 1985. Id. 
V. Recent US FTAs with Arab Countries 
       The U.S. announced its intention to launch a 10-year effort to form a US-Middle East 
free trade area.67 The U.S. will employ a “building-block” approach. This approach 
requires, as a first step, a Middle East country to accede to the WTO or concluding Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreement(s) (TIFA). Afterward, the U.S. will negotiate 
FTA with individual countries. Finally, preferably before 2013, a critical mass of bilateral 
FTAs would come together to form the broader US-Middle East FTA.68 
A. The US-Morocco FTA 
        The U.S. concluded FTA with Morocco.69 The FTA with Morocco addresses 
traditional trade matters. It cuts tariffs and covers all agricultural products.70 In the 
services area, the FTA offers new market access opportunities in Morocco for U.S. 
banks, insurance companies, telecommunications firms, audiovisual services, computer 
                                               
67 See Grary G. Yerkey, President Bush Lays Out Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East by 2013, 
20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 (May 15, 2003). 
68 It is unfortunate that the U.S. adopted such approach by concluding bilateral free trade agreements rather 
than a joint free trade agreement at the outset (bundling approach). The U.S. approach will place these Arab 
countries in weak position on the bargaining table. In FTA negotiations using the bundling approach, 
Middle East countries would be represented by a panel of representatives from each Middle Eastern 
country. Moreover, one has to question the utility of negotiating FTAs with small Middle East countries 
rather than with the Middle East as a whole. In addition, it seems that the U.S. follows the EC footsteps by 
adopting hub and spoke system in which the U.S. would conclude a series of bilateral agreements with 
relatively small countries. In such a system, trade between each spoke and the hub will be more than trade 
among the spokes themselves. 
69 The Senate approved the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement pact July 21, 2004 by a vote of 85-13. The 
U.S. House of Representative approved the pact (H.R. 4842) on July 22, 2004 by a vote of 323-99. 
70 Under the agreement, more than 95 per cent of trade between the U.S. and Morocco in consumer and 
industrial products will become tariff-free immediately, with all the remaining tariffs targeted for 
elimination within nine years. Morocco agreed to immediately eliminate tariffs on products such as 
pistachios, pecans, frozen potatoes, whey products, processed poultry products, pizza cheese, and breakfast 
cereals. Tariffs on other products will be phased out in five years, including walnuts, grapes, pears, 
cherries, and ground turkeys. For its part, the U.S agreed to phase out all agricultural tariffs, most in 15 
years. An agricultural “safeguard” will be available in the event of significant prices reductions for certain 
horticultural products. The negotiations on agriculture had been particularly difficult given Morocco’s huge 
and politically sensitive agriculture sector. Some 12 million Moroccans currently live in rural areas out of a 
total population of roughly 31 million. 
 
and related services, express delivery companies, distribution services, and construction 
and engineering services. 
       Similar to the US-JO FTA, each chapter’s obligations of the US-Morocco FTA are 
parts of the core text of the agreement. The US-Morocco FTA, like the Jordan agreement, 
will require both countries to enforce their own domestic labor and environmental laws, 
as well as to – in the case of labor standards – “strive to ensure” that they match 
internationally recognized standards such as the right of association and the right to 
organize and bargain collectively.71 The U.S. and Morocco commit not weaken or reduce 
labor and environmental laws to attract trade and investment. There were concerns over 
Morocco’s labor laws.72 The FTA between the U.S. and Morocco, in large part, had 
forced Morocco to complete difficult labor reforms, which had been stalled for some 20 
years. The new Moroccan Labor Code that entered into force on June 8, 2004 contains 
provisions dealing with collective bargaining, worker safety, compensation and benefits, 
child labor protections, gender discrimination, and layoff protections. 
       The US-Morocco FTA, however, represents a step backward from the Jordan FTA. 
The US-Morocco FTA lacks adequate safeguards to ensure protection of the 
environment. The US-Morocco FTA excludes certain basic environmental protection 
provisions contained in the US-JO FTA. Moreover, the FTA with Morocco does not 
contain the extensive public participation framework that appeared in NAAEC. The US-
Morocco FTA includes a provision regarding a roster of panelists and panel selection 
                                               
71 See the US-Morocco FTA, arts. 17.1, 17.2(2), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements  
/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/asset_upload_file679_3854.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).  
72 Rep. Sander Levin (D-Mich.), the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, was 
reassured by a letter from the Moroccan government that it is committed to protecting the right to strike for 
Moroccan workers. 
 
procedures which ensure that panels addressing environmental issues have the requisite 
expertise in a side letter, rather than in the core text of the FTA. The US-Morocco FTA 
incorporates parties’ understanding regarding articles XX(b) and XX(g) of GATT, which 
are related to measures necessary for protection of human, animal, plant life or health that 
these articles include environmental measures, in a side letter, rather than in the main text 
of the FTA. In the US-JO FTA, the understanding regarding articles XX(b) and XX(g) of 
GATT was accomplished in the main text.73 
       The labor language contained in the US-Morocco FTA is insufficient to ensure that 
internationally recognized labor standards will be respected. In particular, the US-
Morocco FTA lacks language committing both countries to abide by the core labor 
standards of the International Labor Organization. The labor provisions will not protect 
the core rights of workers in either country. The US-Morocco FTA’s enforcement 
procedures, in particular, completely exclude obligations for governments to meet 
international standards on workers’ rights. In the Morocco FTA, only one labor right 
obligation – the obligation to enforce domestic labor laws- is enforceable through dispute 
settlement. 
      The US-Morocco FTA will allow either country to levy relatively minor monetary 
fines -- rather than trade sanctions -- on the offending country for violating the terms of 
the pact.74 Under the US-Morocco FTA, the offending country will be permitted to settle 
the case by paying an annual “monetary assessment” to the complaining party in 
commercial disputes equivalent to 50 percent of the level of trade that the dispute 
                                               
73 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 6, art. 12.1.  
74 According to the dispute settlement provisions of the US-Morocco FTA, if consultations fail to resolve a 
dispute over non-implementation, a three-member panel will be set up to determine whether the terms of 
the agreement have been breached. 
settlement panel has determined to have been adversely affected by noncompliance.75 
The agreement, however, fixes the limit of the assessments for violations of the labor and 
environmental provisions of the US-Morocco FTA at $15 million, adjusted annually for 
inflation. The assessment cap of $15 million is low that the fines will have little if any 
deterrence effect. The US.-Morocco FTA lacks clear guidelines on how such fine or 
assessment would be spent. Therefore, the US-Morocco FTA approach to resolving trade 
disputes fails to adequately deter egregious behavior. The trade sanctions approach has 
previously been used, for example in the bilateral FTA that the United States has 
concluded with Jordan.  
B. The US-Bahrain FTA 
       The US-Bahrain agreement, the first free trade pact to be negotiated between the U.S 
and a member of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the third with an 
Arab country (after Jordan and Morocco), was finished in May 2004.76 The FTA will free 
up trade in all industrial and consumer products from the day it entered into force and 
will also immediately bring 98 percent of Bahrain’s agricultural tariffs lines to zero 
(alcohol and tobacco excluded). Bahrain will phase out tariffs on the remaining products 
                                               
75 See the US-Morocco FTA, supra n. 71, art. 20.12. A side letter to the US-Morocco FTA drafted by 
Catherine A. Novelli, then assistant U.S. trade representative for Europe and the Mediterranean, said that, if 
the offending party fails to pay the assessment, the complaining country may take “appropriate steps” to 
collect the assessment or “otherwise ensure compliance, bearing in mind the agreement’s objective of 
eliminating barriers to trade and seeking to avoid unduly affecting parties or interests not party to the 
dispute.” The assessments levied under the US-Morocco FTA can be used to pursue appropriate labor or 
environment initiatives, including efforts to improve or enhance enforcement in that [offending] party’s 
territory.  
76 The negotiations took only five months to complete. The talks proceeded relatively smoothly because 
there were no controversial issues that needed to be sorted out. Moreover, the negotiations proceeded 
relatively quickly in part because both sides had decided not to take on new obligations in the area of 
investment in the FTA because a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) already exists between the two 
countries. On Dec. 7, 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives approved implementing legislation for the 
US-Bahrain FTA by a vote of 327 to 95. The Senate on Dec. 13, 2005 approved implementing legislation 
for the agreement by voice vote. On Jan. 11, 2006, President Bush signed legislation (H.R. 4340) 
implementing the U.S. free trade agreement with Bahrain.      
within 10 years. The U.S will give immediate duty-free access on 100 percent of 
Bahrain’s current exports of consumer, industrial, and agricultural products to the U.S. 
Textiles and apparel trade will be duty-free immediately.77 The US-Bahrain FTA also 
requires Bahrain, among other things, to further open its market to U.S. banks and other 
service providers and to strengthen its protection of intellectual property rights.78 . 
Bahrain has made broad commitments to open its service market wider than has any other 
U.S. free trade partner. 
       Bahrainis have made considerable efforts to improve the labor situation in their 2002 
law by legalizing trade unions. The US-Bahrain FTA notably also includes procedures to 
facilitate cooperation between the U.S and Bahrain on environmental and labor matters, 
including a chapter reinforcing Bahrain’s recent legislative actions to expand democracy 
and improve the protection of worker rights, particularly with respect to trade unions.79 
However, the US-Bahrain FTA does not improve labor and environmental standards. The 
United States-Bahrain Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation is 
not an integral part of the trade agreement, rather it is found in a side agreement. 
Moreover, the Memorandum does not have dedicated funding sources. The US-Bahrain 
FTA does not include a statement or provision on promoting sound corporate stewardship 
and good behavior. 
       The FTA lacked some provisions that were included in a previous trade agreement 
with Jordan that would have been appropriate to include in the Bahrain FTA as well. 
                                               
77 Under the US-Bahrain FTA, qualifying textiles and apparel must contain either U.S. or Bahraini yarn and 
fabric. The agreement contains a temporary transitional allowance for textiles and apparel that do not meet 
these requirements so that U.S. and Bahrain producers can develop and expand business contacts. 
78 The services provisions of the US-Bahrain FTA are based on a “negative list” approach, meaning that all 
services sectors are covered unless specifically excluded. 
79 See the United States-Bahrain Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation, art. 2 
(Sep. 2004). 
Additionally, an extensive public participation network, like the one in NAAEC, was 
missing. The labor provisions of the US-Bahrain agreement fall far short of the 
provisions contained in the US-Jordan agreement. Only one of the labor rights 
obligations contained in the US-Bahrain FTA -- i.e., the obligation for Bahrain to enforce 
its own labor laws -- was actually enforceable through dispute settlement.80 All of the 
other obligations contained in the labor chapter of the US-Bahrain FTA are explicitly not 
covered by the dispute settlement system and are thus completely unenforceable. Further, 
fines and sanctions available under labor enforcement measures in the US-Bahrain FTA 
are capped at a low level. The US-Bahrain FTA will allow deficiencies in labor laws to 
persist. In short, the US-Bahrain FTA will not protect workers in either country and 
represents a step backward from the US-JO FTA. 
C. The US-Oman FTA 
       The Oman agreement is the fourth such agreement signed between the U.S. 
and Arab country (after Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain).81 The FTA with Oman addresses 
traditional trade matters such as tariff reductions.82 Under the US-Oman FTA, tariffs on 
100 percent of all consumer and industrial products and 87 percent of all agricultural 
goods will be eliminated on the first day that the agreement takes effect.  
       The free trade agreement with Oman does not contain any specific provisions dealing 
with labor standards. Labor standards were dealt with in the International Labor 
Organization. The absence of any specific provisions dealing with labor standards such as 
                                               
80 Article 15.6 of the US-Bahrain FTA, provides for bilateral consultations if either side fails to carry out its 
obligations on worker rights under the pact, including seeking to improve its labor standards. 
81 See Thomas Signals Support for U.S.-Oman FTA After Middle East Visit, Inside US Trade (Nov. 26, 
2004). On Jan. 19, 2006, the U.S. and Oman signed the FTA.    
82 See U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy wide 
and Selected Sectoral Effects, Investigation No. TA-2104-19, USITC publication 3837 (Feb. 2006). 
 
workers’ rights to organize and prohibition against discrimination could prove a 
perennially contentious issue among members of the U.S. Congress, particularly 
Democrats who push for the inclusion of environment and labor provisions. The US-
Oman FTA actually moves backwards from the labor provisions of the U.S. free trade 
agreement with Jordan. 
VI. Possible Solutions 
       The free trade agreements analyzed in this article represent a step in the right 
direction by recognizing the significance of the trade, environment, and labor. None, 
however, represents a satisfactory solution. These agreements underscore the inherent 
limits in raising labor and environmental standards. Respect for sovereignty, consensus 
on how minimum standards are to be determined, and the suspicion of disguised 
protectionism all pose challenges for designing a model respectful of high labor and 
environment standards yet consistent with true trade liberalization. 
       Trade, environment, and labor matters demand a comprehensive evaluation and an 
aggressive plan of reform offering reliable and lasting resolution. In its final analysis, this 
article asserts that no one approach is entirely satisfactory unto itself; each engenders 
uncertainty, either in terms of whether it can be implemented or whether, if implemented, 
it can offer meaningful resolution. A combination of approaches might be called for. This 
article does, however, make one unequivocal finding: cooperation between advocates of 
free trade and advocates of environmental and labor protection is an important element of 
resolution no matter which approach is selected. Both interests must recognize that 
healthy, sustainable economic growth depends on protection of the environment and 
worker rights. In turn, vigorous advocacy of environmental and labor protection is best 
achieved in a thriving global economy infused by free trade.   
       One strategy that represents a long-term, possibly utopian, solution to resolving trade 
and environment disputes is the creation of a Global Environmental Organization that 
would be to environmental protection what the GATT/WTO regime is to trade 
liberalization. Another key strategy is the recognition that the goal of potential penalties 
in free trade agreements between the U.S. and Arab countries is not to utilize them per se, 
but rather to establish a disincentive or punishment that is adequate to deter a party from 
failing to carry out its obligations, and thus encourage voluntary compliance. Because the 
ultimate victim of a party’s non-compliance is the working population of that country and 
not the government or employers, care must be taken to ensure that the penalty will help 
and not harm those workers. A fine that is used directly to address the labor or 
environment problem may be more effective than a withdrawal of trade benefits in 
correcting the underlying violations. One additional consideration to be taken into 
account in establishing penalties is any asymmetry of power and wealth between the 
parties. A withdrawal of benefits may hurt a small or more open economy more than a 
large or less open one. By contrast, fines could be structured in such a way as to equalize 
the relative impact of penalties. However existing trade agreements do not make use of 
this potential, as they impose caps on fines that are the same for all parties, regardless of 
differences in the size of their economies and traded sectors. For example, the US-
Morocco establish a maximum fine of $15 million for a party’s failure to enforce its labor 
laws, despite the very different impact that a fine of that magnitude would have on the 
budget of the U.S compared to that of Morocco. 
       Enforcement mechanisms in trade agreements between the U.S. and Arab countries 
have relied on penalties, or negative incentives, for deterrence in the first instance and 
punishment as a last resort. But it is also possible to elicit compliance with 
environment and labor commitments through positive incentives. For example, trade 
agreements between the U.S. and Arab countries could set quotas for exports to the U.S. 
The quotas can be increased if those countries meet obligations it undertook to improve 
enforcement of its own environmental and labor laws. 
       Guaranteeing respect for environment and labor rights necessarily entails roles for 
both governments and private sector employers. While the U.S. trade agreements with 
Arab countries impose binding obligations on governments, it is private sector employers 
who determine, in the first instance, whether environmental and labor rights are a 
reality in the private sector workplace. Therefore it is important to take both of these 
actors into account in fashioning environment-labor-trade linkages. 
       Virtually all trade agreements between the U.S. and Arab countries envisage 
cooperation and technical assistance between the parties on environment and labor 
matters. Some create new institutional mechanisms to carry out such activities and to 
engage in technical assistance (e.g., the US-Bahrain FTA). In practice, the cooperation 
has not been very extensive or sustained. Discussions (whether through hearings, 
workshops or other fora) that are linked to allegations of existing problems - and that 
could lead to adverse consequences such as sanctions - can elicit more attention from key 
actors and are more likely to change their behavior than activities that are seen as purely 
informative. A final point about technical assistance must be considered. The actual 
amount of capacity-building needed is huge. If cooperative capacity-building and 
technical assistance are to be seen as a meaningful complement to direct trade incentives 
or penalties, financial resources must be committed on a higher order of magnitude than 
current efforts. 
       Combining technical assistance and capacity-building with economically 
meaningful positive or negative consequences is likely to produce better results, in terms 
of faster and sustained improvement, than implementing technical assistance in isolation. 
Carefully designed programs that combine trade opportunities (with incentives for 
compliance with labor rights or penalties for non-compliance) and targeted technical 
assistance carry the greatest promise for swift progress on environment and labor. 
VII. Conclusion 
       The US-JO FTA can be subdivided into two packages: the less controversial package 
of tariff reductions and the more controversial relating to environment and labor issues. 
The US-JO FTA would have been of little value if it did not include environment and 
labor provisions within the text of the FTA. The U.S. demanded that these provisions be 
included within the text of the FTA.  
       Free trade agreements compound the dilemma of discerning how to adequately 
protect the environment and worker rights. This article argues that the US-JO FTA does 
not possess the language or enforcement mechanisms necessary to truly protect the 
environment and labor. The environment and labor provisions in the US-Morocco FTA, 
US-Bahrain FTA, and US-Oman FTA were not stronger than those contained in the US-
JO FTA. The free trade agreements after the US-JO FTA demonstrate that the pendulum 
has shifted back to a position where environment and labor are not as important as trade.        
       The environment and labor provisions of the US-JO FTA may be described as “not 
unexpected and material step but falling short.” Applying all of these terms can help form 
judgments about the significance of these provisions. The social clause of the US-JO 
FTA may be described as “not unexpected” because it was negotiated by the Clinton 
administration and its constituencies who advocate for the protection of the environment 
and worker rights. The exchange of side letters between the U.S. and Jordan was not 
expected by the Bush administration who appears to be resisting incorporating such 
language in bilateral free trade pacts. 
       Articles 5 (environment) and 6 (labor) of the US-JO FTA represent material steps 
towards advancing an environmental and labor agenda by linking the FTA with non-trade 
provisions. However, these articles fall short of expectations. For example, the U.S. and 
Jordan have recognized in the FTA that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing 
domestic environmental and labor laws, but the FTA does not prohibit the parties from 
doing so. The FTA does not define the relationship between the FTA and the multilateral 
environmental agreements. Moreover, the FTA does not define terms such as “sustained 
action/inaction.” The social clause of the US-JO FTA was structured in a way that would 
avoid the language of standards. The US-JO FTA contains a scapegoat clause that allows 
each party to exercise discretion in allocating resources to enforce its environment or 
labor laws. The US-JO FTA does not permit non-governmental organization to submit 
claims that either party is failing to enforce its environmental or labor laws effectively. 
       Recent U.S. FTAs with Arab countries do not advance environment and labor 
protection. On the contrary, these FTAs move backward. They negate the material step 
taken in the US-JO FTA which included environment and labor provisions in the core 
text of the agreement for the first time in trade history. The US-Morocco FTA lacks 
language committing both countries to abide by the core labor standards of the 
International Labor Organization. The labor provisions of the US-Bahrain agreement fall 
far short of the provisions contained in the US-Jordan agreement. Only one of the labor 
rights obligations contained in the US-Bahrain FTA -- i.e., the obligation for the U.S. and 
Bahrain to enforce its own labor laws -- was actually enforceable through dispute 
settlement. Further, fines and sanctions available under labor enforcement measures in 
the US-Bahrain FTA are capped. The free trade agreement with Oman does not contain 
any specific provisions dealing with labor standards. 
       The US-Jordan FTA, which is generally considered to have the most rigorous 
labor provisions of any trade agreement, includes both national and international 
standards among its obligations. In contrast to the US-Jordan FTA, the recently 
concluded US-Bahrain and US-Oman FTAs transform a similar commitment by the 
parties to “strive to ensure” that their laws protect the fundamental ILO rights into a 
purely hortatory exercise. This is done by explicitly excluding the possibility of dispute 
settlement proceedings if a party fails in that commitment. 
       In recent years since environment and labor rights provisions were included in US-
Arab trade agreements, significant experience has accumulated. It is now possible to 
examine the different tacks that have been taken and to begin to draw some conclusions 
about the likely efficacy of various approaches. No one model has yet emerged as a 
single template for future US-Arab trade agreements, but some approaches stand out for 
their achievements or compelling logic. The US-Jordan FTA has several provisions that 
set a benchmark for the parties in addressing environment and labor rights. At the same 
time, there are many useful positive and negative lessons to be learned from other Arab 
trade agreements that take different approaches. In coming years, countries have the 
chance to learn these lessons and apply them in new and more successful combinations. 
   
